[보도자료]

ILO, 복수노조 교섭창구 단일화에 대한 노동부의 거짓말 확인

- 교섭창구 강제 단일화는 ILO기준에 부합은커녕, 정면 위반 -

 

 

1. 한국 정부가 개악 노조법의 복수노조 창구단일화 강제제도로 다시 한 번 국제사회의 망신을 샀습니다. 이채필 노동부장관이 지난 100차 ILO 총회 때 ‘현행 한국의 교섭창구 단일화 제도가 ILO의 입장에 부합한다’는 취지의 발언을 한 것과 관련해, 국제노동기구(ILO)가 이를 부인했습니다. 이같은 내용은 민주노총과 한국노총이 ILO를 상대로 발송한 질의공문(1차 3.7., 2차 6.28.)에 대한 답변(1차 3.7., 2차 7.11.)을 통해 밝혀졌습니다. 

2. 민주노총과 한국노총은 최근 한국 정부와 일부 언론이 ILO의 일반 원칙을 왜곡해, 마치 국제사회가 한국의 교섭창구 단일화 제도에 대해 구체적인 정당성을 부여한 것처럼 호도하는 것과 관련한 질의서를 지난 3월과 6월 두 차례에 걸쳐 발송했습니다. ILO 카렌 커티스 국제기준국 부국장은 “한국에서 시행될 교섭창구 단일화 제도에 대해 ILO 감시감독 기구 차원의 검토가 있었는지 여부”를 묻는 민주노총과 한국노총의 질의에 대해 “한국 정부는 ILO 협약 87호와 98호를 비준하지 않았기 때문에 (한국의 교섭창구 단일화 강제제도를) 전문가 위원회에서 다룬 바 없다”면서 “(한국의 교섭창구 단일화 강제 제도는) 오는 11월 결사의 자유 위원회에서 심의될 예정”이라고 알려 왔습니다. 

3. ILO 87호 협약은 ‘결사의 자유 및 단결권 보호에 관한 협약’이며, 98호 협약은 ‘단결권 및 단체교섭권 원칙의 적용에 관한 협약’입니다. 이 두 협약은 ILO가 정한 ‘핵심 협약(Core Conventions)’으로, 한국정부는 수차례에 걸친 ILO의 권고에도 불구하고 이를 비준하지 않아 국제사회로부터 ‘노동후진국’이란 손가락질을 받고 있습니다. 위 협약을 비준한 국가의 제도는 ‘전문가 위원회(Committee of Experts)에서 심의됩니다. 한국의 경우 위 협약을 비준하지 않았기 때문에 전문가 위원회의 심의를 거치지 않았으며, 결사의 자유 위원회(Committee on Freedom of Association)에 제소된 개악 노조법 사건의 경우 오는 11월에 첫 심의가 예정돼 있습니다. 

4. 즉 한국 정부는 공식적인 ILO의 심의 과정이 없었음에도 불구하고, 마치 ILO가 한국의 교섭창구 단일화 강제방안에 대해 '적합 승인‘을 한 것처럼 속여 왔다는 것이 확인된 셈입니다. 그러나 정작 ILO는 이와 같은 승인절차를 밟은 바가 없다는 것이 확인됐습니다. 그간 ILO는 교섭 방식과 관련해 △해당 국가의 구체적인 노사관계와 노사문화를 반영 △노사정간 충분한 논의와 합의 △소수노조의 교섭권 보장 등의 일반원칙을 제기해 왔습니다. 이에 비춰볼 때 한국의 교섭창구 단일화 강제방안은 ILO 기준에 부합하기는커녕, 오히려 정면으로 위반되는 제도입니다. 

5. ILO는 이밖에도 지난 2월 삼성경제연구소가 주도해 구성한 ‘복수노조 산학합동연구단’의 ILO 방문 직후 나온 일부 언론보도와 관련해서도 “관련 기사와 제목이 왜곡됐다”면서 “단체교섭제도는 각국의 특정 노사관계 역사를 고려해 이에 맞게 결정되어야 한다는 점을 강조했다”고 밝혀 왔습니다. 지난 2월 산학협동연구단의 ILO 방문에 동행했던 일부 신문은 ILO 카렌 커티스 국제기준국 부국장 발언을 인용해 ‘복수노조 설립을 허용할 경우 교섭창구를 단일화해야 하며 창구단일화는 좋은 제도’라며 ‘ILO에서는 복수노조 시행으로 근로자 개인의 단결권만 보장된다면 노조의 권리인 교섭권과 단체행동권은 어느 정도 침해해도 된다는 해석을 내렸다’고 보도했습니다. 

6. ILO는 이번 답변에서 △설사 노조설립에 필요한 최소인원 제한을 두더라도 노동자의 단결권을 침해하지 않는 최소 수준이어야 한다는 점 △(삼성경제연구소가 질의했던 ‘비노조 근로자 대표기구’ 관련) ILO의 기준과 원칙은 단체교섭의 우선적 파트너(favoured partner)가 노동조합임을 상기시키고 있다는 점 등도 확인했습니다.

 

 

2011. 7. 12.

 

※ 세부사항 문의 : 이승철 정책국장 010-3389-2163

※ 첨부자료 : 민주노총 질의에 대한 ILO 기준적용국 카렌 커티스 부국장 답신 원문

 

1. Minimum number of workers for establishing a union

C87 and C98 do not specify the minimum number of workers needed to establish a union. However, it is known that the industry-academy joint study team has made an inquiry on the ILO's stance on the legal requirement for a minimum of 20 workers to establish a trade union. Could you kindly explain what your official positions are?  

There is absolutely no requirement in international labour standards to have a minimum number of workers to be formed. Indeed, I explained to Samsung group that some countries have no minimum (eg., Portugal or France) and this has never raised any concern by the supervisory bodies. What the supervisory bodies have said is that, if it is considered necessary to set out a minimum requirement, it must be kept at reasonably low so as not to infringe the rights of workers to form organizations. 20 has been considered an acceptable number in certain countries, but is by no means a requirement. It is important not to confuse the general right to organize, which should be made as simple as possible, with eventually a determination of representativity, which can set out certain numerical criteria. 

For your reference, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA) does not impose any restrictions on the establishment of a union. According to Article 5 of TULRAA, workers are free to organize a trade union or to join it, except for public servants or teachers who are subject to other enactments. Article 10 of the Act stipulates that if two or more workers submit required documents to administrative authorities, the authorities shall issue a certificate within three days after the report on establishment.

2. Bargaining Channel Unification under the union pluralism at enterprise level

Using the article which was written by a journalist joined the study visit with SERI, Korean government is insisting that the bargaining channel unification system, which is to be enforced from July 1, 2011, is desirable and in line with the ILO principle of freedom of association. (“The revised Act of 2010 addresses the unique circumstances of the Republic of Korea’s industrial relations and is in compliance with international standards. The ILO has recognized that this system of collective bargaining with exclusive rights for the most representative trade union is compatible with the principles of freedom of association. Hence-forth, trade unions in the country will enjoy a high level of autonomy. The workers’ right to organize will now be fully guaranteed...” Lee, Minister of Labor and Employment, 100th ILC). However, there are a lot of problems with this system; it limits rights to bargain and act collectively by giving priority to the logic of cutting down of bargaining cost over guaranteeing basic labour rights in the Constitution, regulates the specific procedure of the unification by law, not by the democratic rule of the unions, restricts bargaining unit within business or workplace not recognizing industrial bargaining, and prohibits separation of bargaining units according to an agreement between labour and management, etc. In this sense trade unions are standing against its enforcement and many lawmakers are criticising it.

Nevertheless, the Korean government is pushing ahead with its enforcement, putting a varnish on the general position on the exclusive rights for the most representative trade union as if it were its decision on the very system of Korea. Can we ask if the "forced bargaining channel unification under the union pluralism at enterprise level" which is to be enforced on July 1, 2011 has ever been reviewed in the supervisory mechanism of the ILO? If it is the case, what was ILO's recommendation to the Korean government?

As the Government has not ratified Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, the Committee of Experts has not reviewed this question. The matter is pending before the Committee on Freedom of Association which is expected to review the basic system at its next meeting in November. It will also take into account the concerns raised by the unions when it looks at the new amendments as well as any information on the application in practice.

3. Non-Union Employee Representative System

C87 and C98 provides freedom of association of workers' and employers' organisations. Samsung, which is notorious for the management without union, and other business seems to want to interpret the conventions into that any NER is subject to the C87 and C98. In other words, they want to include NERs in the procedure for the bargaining channel unification-if the NER consists of majority of the total employees it becomes the bargaining representative, or if it is not of majority and there is no such an organisation, it joins the bargaining representative composed proportionally. Could you give us your opinion on this matter? What does the "workers' organisation" in the C87 and C98 exactly mean?  

Workers’ organization is defined in article 10 of Convention No. 87 as any organization for the furtherance and defence of workers’ interests. The key here of course is “organization” which carries with it a structural and sustainable notion. ILO standards and principles recall for collective bargaining purposes that the favoured partner should be trade unions (elected representatives should not undermine trade unions in the exercise of their exclusive prerogatives – C135, collective bargaining is with workers’ organizations – C98, 154, definition of collective agreement is only with workers’ representatives in the absence of a trade union – R91).

For your reference, in Korean legal system, only trade union is considered as subject of collective bargaining and non-union organisation is not recognised as representative of workers' interest in the bargaining, being in the dependent relation to employers.

This is fully in line with ILO principles.